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Written and Unwritten Constitutions: A New Approach to the Study of Constitutional Government in China

Shigong, J. — Thu, 19 Nov 2009 01:07:32 PST

Criticizing the formalism in China’s constitutional studies over the past 30 years and following an empirical-historical perspective to deal with the dilemma of representation and practice, the author argues that both a written constitution and an unwritten constitution are basic features of any constitutional system, and China’s constitutional order can only be understood if China’s unwritten constitution is taken into account. Selecting four important constitutional issues (the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the National People’s Congress; the position of state chairman and the trinity system of rule; the relationship between the center and localities; and the constitutional structure of "one country two systems"), the author explores four sources of China’s unwritten constitution—the party’s constitution, constitutional conventions, constitutional doctrine, and constitutional statutes—and calls for taking into account China’s unique political tradition and reality to enrich current constitutional scholarship.

Beyond the Right-Left Divide: Searching for Reform from the History of Practice

Huang, P. C. C. — Thu, 19 Nov 2009 01:07:32 PST

Does a history-of-practice-based research approach lack prospective vision—as the commentators suggest? Seen in terms of practice, local governments working under a decentralized system allowing for initiative and competition, and a centralized cadre evaluation-appointment system that prizes gross domestic product growth above all else, have been the driving force for economic development. Their secret in attracting investments has been cheap peasant labor, used without regard to labor laws and benefits or environmental protection. That is the system that lies at the root both of stunning economic development and mounting social-environmental crisis. Such an analysis calls for better provision of public services and social welfare to address the issue of social equity and also to expand the domestic market. But the central leadership’s stated goal of changing the state system from an extractive-controlling one to a service-oriented one can only be so much empty talk unless the cadre evaluation system itself is revamped.

How Authoritarian Rule Works

O'Brien, K. J. — Thu, 19 Nov 2009 01:07:32 PST

Common features of the articles by Xueguang Zhou and Jiang Shigong include attention to governance rather than reform or regime change, to informal as well as formal rules, and to practice over texts. The articles differ mainly in their level of abstraction and the reach of their findings. But even here, Zhou’s "organizational practices" are essentially micro-level variants of the broader, constitutional principles that Jiang explores. Both authors make a persuasive case that there are abiding rules that pattern behavior between Chinese political elites, though what these rules are, and what distinguishes constitutional principles from other institutions (and temporary political compromises), await further study.

Chinese Constitutional Currents

White, L. T. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 22:34:53 PST

The Chinese constitution in action is far more flexible than the written state charter might suggest. Jiang Shigong and Xueguang Zhou best capture China’s actual constitutional patterns of power, appointment, jurisdiction, and amendment when they treat China as complex, evolving, and large.

Introduction to "Constitutionalism, Reform, and the Nature of the Chinese State: Dialogues among Western and Chinese Scholars, III"

Huang, P. C. C. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 22:34:54 PST

The Institutional Logic of Collusion among Local Governments in China

Zhou, X. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 22:34:54 PST

A salient organizational phenomenon in the Chinese bureaucracy is collusion among local governments in response to policies and directives from higher authorities; local governments often form alliances to compromise the original intention behind state policies. There are thus significant and persistent deviations and goal displacement in policy implementation. This article develops an organizational analysis and theoretical explanation of this phenomenon. It argues as follows: Collusion among local governments, though informal, is generated and perpetuated by the institutional logic of the Chinese bureaucracy, results from organizational adaptation to its environment, and hence acquires legitimacy and becomes highly institutionalized. In particular, the institutional logic of the Chinese bureaucracy has generated three organizational paradoxes—uniformity in policy making and flexibility in implementation, incentive intensity and goal displacement, bureaucratic impersonality and the personalization of administrative ties—which provide legitimate bases for collusion among local governments. Bureaucratic collusion has been greatly exacerbated in recent years because of the unintended consequences of the centralization of authority and the enforcement of incentive mechanisms in the bureaucracy.

New Approaches to the Study of Political Order in China

Clarke, D. C. — Sun, 15 Nov 2009 22:34:54 PST

Both Xueguang Zhou and Jiang Shigong are interested in the way in which China’s political order actually functions, but for different reasons. Zhou takes how things are—in this case, the way central-local relations work—more or less as a given and seeks to provide an explanation. Jiang, on the other hand, writes precisely because he believes that how China’s political order actually operates has received far too little attention in constitutional scholarship. Zhou focuses on the narrow issue of collusion between different levels of lower-level government when faced with demands from a higherlevel authority. His focus is useful in drawing attention to this ill-understood feature of central-local relations. Yet many of the problems he discusses seem to be less those of collusion as such and more those of ordinary principal-agent conflicts. Jiang calls for less formalism and more realism when analyzing China’s constitutional order. While fully acknowledging the merits of Jiang’s proposed methodology, the comment finds that Jiang’s own approach retains some formalist elements.

From a Hierarchy in Time to a Hierarchy in Space: The Meanings of Sino-Babylonianism in Early Twentieth-Century China

Hon, T.-k. — Thu, 22 Oct 2009 02:49:25 PDT

In 1892, Terrien de Lacouperie (1845–1894), professor of Chinese at University College in London, set out to prove that the Chinese migrated from Mesopotamia in prehistoric times. Despite mixed responses from his colleagues, Lacouperie’s "Sino-Babylonianism" found its way into China and captured the imagination of Chinese historians from the 1900s to 1930s. Whether they supported or opposed Lacouperie’s view, Chinese historians were intrigued by his boldness in linking early China to the global network of trade and cultural exchange. This article examines how Chinese historians adopted, transformed, and appropriated Sino-Babylonianism in their discourse on the nation. It argues that the rise and fall of Sino-Babylonianism coincided with the Chinese perceptions of the world system of nation-states. Sino-Babylonianism was warmly received when the Chinese perceived the world system of nation-states as a hierarchy in temporality, prescribing a process of evolution that all human communities must follow. Sino-Babylonianism was fiercely rejected when the Chinese saw the world system of nation-states as a hierarchy in space, characterized by incessant territorial expansion of imperialist powers. In both instances, Sino-Babylonianism was no longer what Lacouperie had proposed in the late nineteenth century. Rather, it was an important benchmark for the Chinese understanding of the modern global order.